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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE LABOR DEBATE IN ARGENTINA
During the afternoon of August 26, 1998, gridlock froze the major
avenues of downtown Buenos Aires. Hundreds of workers from an
opposition truckers' union had taken to the streets to demonstrate their
aversion to the Labor Reform Act that would soon be debated in the
National Congress.1 In addition, thousands of other unionists protested
in front of the National Congress.2 The government coalition party, the
Peronista Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista), had for the third time
failed to obtain the quorum needed to bring the reform to the congres-
1. See Caos en la ciudad por las protestas [Chaos in the City Due to Protests], LA NAC16N
(Buenos Aires), August 27, 1998, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>.
2. See Reforma laboral: otra vez sin debate [Labor Reform: Once Again Without Debate],
LA NACIN (Buenos Aires), August 27, 1998, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>.
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sional floor.3 Previously, President Menem had warned that, if neces-
sary, he would enact the reforms as a presidential decree.4
In 1976, the Argentine National Congress passed the Labor Con-
tract Law (Law No. 20.744) which established a regime for the govern-
ance of employment contracts.5 Law No. 20.744 has two hundred and
seventy-seven articles and governs almost every aspect of the labor-
management relationship. The law presumes the existence of a labor
contract between an employer and employee, even in the absence of a
written agreement6 and it also prescribes the employer's duties and obli-
gations.7 The most controversial of the statutory obligations are those
that direct an employer to indemnify a former employee after an unjust
discharge or after a discharge due to reduced business activity that is not
attributable to the employer.8
Critics of the 1976 Labor Contract Law claim that the burdensome
indemnification is a major cause of the high rate of unemployment in
Argentina.9 These critics argue that employers are reluctant to hire new
employees, even during a period of economic growth, since a subse-
quent economic downturn might require layoffs that generate substantial
indemnification costs for employers.° On the other hand, proponents of
the Labor Contract Law assert that the indemnification system protects
workers from arbitrary discharge and provides Argentines with a more
humane labor market that does not subject their livelihoods to the whims
of a market economy."
At the heart of this debate is the clash between the pro-labor Per-
onist ideologues and the business leaders who believe that the economy
and unemployment would benefit from an unrestrained labor market.
3. See id.
4. See En el gobierno ya no hay apuro [The Government Is No Longer in a Rush], LA
NACI6N (Buenos Aires), August 27, 1998, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>.
5. Law No. 20.744, September 20, 1974 [XXXIV-D] A.D.L.A. 3207. In 1974, the
Argentine Congress passed law number 20.744, which governed labor contracts for two years. In
1976, President Videla, who rose to power by a military coup and ruled by decree, authorized
executive decree number 390/76, which incorporated changes into law number 20.744 and
renumbered many of the articles. The text ordered by executive decree number 390/76 is still the
law of labor employment contracts today and this comment cites the decree as the source of the
law. In addition, this comment cites directly to the congressional law when a law modified the
text ordered by the executive decree.
6. Law No. 20.744, art. 23, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, May 13, 1976,
[XXXVI-B] A.D.L.A. 1175, 1177.
7. Law No. 20.744, arts. 67 - 89, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1180-82.
8. Law No. 24.013, art 153, December 5, 1991 [LI-D] A.D.L.A. 3873, 3903.
9. See Laura Luz Ojeda, Dudas par el efecto de la reforma laboral [Doubts Over the Effects
of Labor Reform], LA NACI6N (Buenos Aires), September 4, 1998, <http://www.
lanacion.com.ar>.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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This comment will examine the criticisms of the 1976 Labor Contract
Law and the 1998 Labor Reform Act, and evaluate whether the Reform
Act will significantly alter the balance of power in Argentine labor
relations.
The remainder of the introduction will describe the unique constitu-
tional, historical, political and economic circumstances that have carried
Argentina to this critical stage in labor relations. The comment will then
examine the 1976 Labor Contract Law and indicate how the Labor
Reform Act has modified the original regime. This comment will also
utilize case law to illustrate how the country's labor laws are applied in
practice. The comment will conclude with an analysis of how the
changing labor market might be viewed by foreign investors.
A. Constitutional Origins
The extraordinary scope of Argentine labor laws is rooted in the
national constitution. Like most Latin American constitutions, but
unlike that of the United States, the Argentine Constitution provides
Argentines with the right to work. Article 14 of the Constitution pro-
vides that every inhabitant shall enjoy the right to work and engage in
any lawful industry, as well as the right to associate for useful
purposes. I2
Article 14 takes the general "right to work" a major step further by
enumerating specific rights guaranteed to each worker. The enumerated
rights include: dignified working conditions, equality of labor, limited
workdays, days off and paid vacations, just compensation, minimum
wage, equal pay for equal work, access to the earnings of the business
with control of production and contribution to management, protection
against arbitrary discharge, stability in public employment, and free and
democratic labor organization. 3 The enumeration of such labor-ori-
ented rights in the Constitution undoubtedly encourages high expecta-
tions of labor.
B. Historical Roots
Juan Domingo Per6n was a military officer who was elected presi-
dent of Argentina in 1946, after his participation in a 1943 Military
coup.14 Since the labor movement, and the General Labor Confedera-
tion (Confederaci6n General de Trabajo, "CGT") in particular, were
instrumental in his rise to power, Per6n fashioned himself as a champion
12. CONST. ARG., art. 14.
13. Id. at art. 14 bis.
14. See DAVID R. DECKER, THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND LABOR CLIMATE OF ARGENTINA
at 6-7, (Multinational Industrial Relations Series No. 4, 1983).
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of workers' rights, to the chagrin of many of his fellow officers. 5
Although Per6n's relationship with the labor movement was not always
cordial, Per6n did bring labor onto the national stage, where it would
remain powerful for decades after his departure.'
6
However, the origins of the Argentine Labor movement predate
Per6n's presidency. Argentina is a nation of immigrants, most of whom
immigrated from Italy and Spain in the nineteenth century.' 7 More
important to the Argentine labor movement however, are other immi-
grants from Northern Europe who carried with them one of the dominant
ideologies of the working-class movement in Europe at that time:
socialism.' 8 The importation of this socio-economic theory has had
profound effects on the labor debate in Argentina because the European-
socialist approach to the labor market fundamentally differs from the
American-free market approach.
Mariano Grondona, columnist for La Naci6n, a leading Argentine
daily newspaper, aptly described the basic differences between the Euro-
pean and American approaches to the labor market:
In the United States labor system, labor is treated as any other good
or service subject to the market laws of supply and demand. If the
demand for labor increases, salaries and employment increase. If the
demand decreases, then the opposite occurs. They hire and fire
employees with complete liberty. This extreme flexibility of employ-
ment gives the American system its dizzying mobility . . . In the
European system, employment is protected from economic swings
for social reasons.19
Grondona also noted that Argentina began to embrace the European
model under President Per6n.2 ° He concluded that while the American
system may seem "inhuman," it has yielded a very high employment
rate and high wages, causing a large migration of workers to the United
States.2'
Grondona's comments are evidence that the labor debate in Argen-
tina is at least partly divided along the European-socialist and U.S.-
capitalist ideologies; and under Per6n's tutelage and legacy, the social-
ists have generally prevailed. However, the current realities of the
15. See id.
16. See id. at 9.
17. See id. at 68.
18. See id.
19. Mariano Grondona, Reforma o regresidn laboral? [Labor Reform or Regression?], LA
NACION (Buenos Aires), September 6, 1998, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>.
20. See id.
21. Id.
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Argentine economy may have fundamentally altered that balance of
power.
C. The Economic Reality
The United Nations reported that in 1996 the Argentine unemploy-
ment rate was a staggering 17.2 percent, a dramatic increase from the
1988 rate of 6.3 percent.22 This alarming statistic is tempered by the low
inflation rate of 0.1 percent in 1996, and the stabilization of the Argen-
tine Peso by fixing its value against the dollar.23 Most Argentines would
agree that the high unemployment rate is one of the most immediate and
significant economic challenges facing the country. The specter of high
unemployment has hung heavily over the labor reform debate and has
fueled the intense emotions of its participants, as evidenced by the dem-
onstrations in Buenos Aires in 1998.
However, the uncertain future sustainability of low inflation and the
fixed exchange rate is of significant concern. During the 1980's, run-
away inflation plagued Argentina; by 1990, the annual rate of inflation
exceeded 1,300 percent.24 In 1991, the Argentine National Congress
passed the Convertibility Law, which fixed the exchange rate of the
Argentine Peso to one peso per U.S. dollar. The Convertibility Law was
remarkably successful in stabilizing the Argentine currency and the
inflation rate by providing full foreign exchange backing of the mone-
tary base. 5
Recently, however, Argentines have noticed that several of their
neighbors, most notably Brazil, have fallen into recessions and are
experiencing currency devaluation. 26 Argentina is now concerned that
the artificial rate of exchange will fall, subjecting the citizenry to a new
round of hyperinflation.27 Such fears have caused President Menem to
consider adopting the U.S. dollar as the Argentine national currency.28
These grave concerns over inflation, the future of the exchange
rate, and the fate of the economy in general, all serve as an impetus for
labor reform. When people hear that poor economic times are on the
horizon, their thoughts often focus on their own job security and eco-
22. See ECONOMIC COMM'N FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, UNITED NATIONS,
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 144 (1996-1997).
23. See id.
24. See Jos6 Antonio Ocampo and Robert Steiner, Foreign Capital in Latin America: An
Overview, in FOREIGN CAPITAL IN LATIN AMERICA, 1, 17 (Jose Antonio Ocampo and Robert
Steiner, eds., 1994).
25. See id.
26. See David Wessel et al., Passing the Buck: Argentina Considers a Radical Peso Defense:
Use Dollars Instead, WALL ST. J., January 18, 1999, at Al.
27. See id.
28. See id.
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nomic well-being. In a 1998 Gallup Poll, forty-eight percent of Argen-
tines polled stated they "fear that they will lose their job this year. 29
Given such wide spread uncertainty, it comes as no surprise that
thousands took to the streets when Congress debated labor reform.
The debate over labor reform also concerns foreign investors. With
the recent downturn of several Latin American economies, foreign
investors have been researching Latin American investment opportuni-
ties with a critical eye. Even before the labor reform, obligations that
arose from labor contracts passed unchanged with the transfer of title of
an Argentine business entity.3 ° In other words, if a foreign business
entity merges with or acquires an Argentine business, that foreign busi-
ness is liable for all the labor obligations that existed at the time of
transfer. Therefore, a foreign investor should take a hard look at those
obligations before making a decision, especially with businesses involv-
ing large labor forces. The trepidation of Argentine employees and the
frustrations of Argentine business persons and foreign investors are all
factors which result in a confusing political debate over labor reform.
D. The Political Debate
Since there are so many sides to the debate over labor reform in
Argentina, it was not surprising that Menem and his party were frus-
trated by their repeated attempts to obtain a quorum for a vote on labor
reform. The Menem Administration and its party, the Peronista Jus-
ticialist Party, are the primary proponents of the legislation. The largest
government opposition party, the Alliance Party, opposes the reform.
The national labor unions are divided; the CGT has supported the
Menem Administration, yet the Argentine Workers Office and Argen-
tine Workers Movement have opposed the reform." Argentine business
leaders are also divided. The chaotic debate has led to much confusion,
making it difficult for outsiders, as well as Argentines, to understand
what is at stake. In a poll taken during the height of the debate, forty
percent of the three hundred and seventy Argentine business persons
polled in Buenos Aires admitted to knowing "very little" about the
initiative.32
The confusion over the meaning of the proposed reforms, and the
splintering of parties who are usually aligned on questions of labor,
made it very difficult for Menem and the Peronistas to move the Labor
29. El 48% de la gente teme por su empleo [48% of the People Fear for Their Jobs], LA
NAC1ON (Buenos Aires), January 10, 1999, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>.
30. See Law No. 20.744, art. 225, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1197-98.
31. See Reforma laboral: otra vez sin debate, supra note 2.
32. Disidencias entre los empresarios [Differences Among Business Leaders], LA NACON
(Buenos Aires), September 4, 1998, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>.
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Reform Act through parliamentary procedure. In fact, it was only
through unscrupulous legislative behavior that the Peronista Justicialist
Party was able to gain approval for the Act.33 Since the opposition did
not wish to give the Peronistas a quorum, most of the opposing repre-
sentatives did not take their seats the morning the reform was scheduled
for debate and vote.34 Once the quorum was obtained, the Justicialist
Party immediately took a vote to advance the reform debate to the next
item on the day's agenda.35 The decision to move up the debate was
voted on electronically in approximately twenty seconds. 36 The Jus-
ticialist Party then closed the debate on the reform in less than one min-
ute, thereby opening the vote on the reform while some members of the
opposition were absent.37  After the passage of the Act, President
Menem announced that it was a "spectacular and historic day."'38 Let us
examine how this "historic day" will be viewed by the Argentine labor
force, labor leaders, businessmen and foreign investors.
II. THE ARGENTINE LABOR CONTRACT LAW AS MODIFIED BY THE
1998 LABOR REFORM ACT
In general, Argentine Labor Contract Law requires documentation
of all labor relationships in a contract. 39 At the commencement of the
employment relationship, there is a trial period when an employer may
discharge an employee with or without cause without any liability.4" If
the employer discharges the employee after the trial period however, the
employer must indemnify the discharged employee.4
Law No. 20.744 of the Labor Contract Law of 1976 outlines the
regime governing employment contracts. While still in force today, the
regime of Law No. 20.744 has been substantially revised by Law No.
25.013 (the Labor Reform Act), promulgated September 22, 1998. The
Labor Reform Act eliminates several specific types of labor contracts
and substantially alters the trial periods and system of indemnification.
In addition, the Act greatly increases the collective bargaining power of
33. See El pais atrasa: convierten en la ley laboral [The Nation is Set Back: The Labor
Reform Becomes Law], DIARIO AMBITO FINANCIERO (Buenos Aires), September 3, 1998, <http://
www.ambitofinanciero.com>.
34. See id. at 2.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Menem estdfeliz por la reforma [Menem Is Happy Over Reform], CLARIN (Buenos Aires),
September 4, 1998, <http://www.clarin.com.ar>.
39. See Law No. 20.744, art.21, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1177.
40. See Law No. 25.013, art.3, September 22, 1998, [LVIII-D] A.D.L.A. 3888, 3889-90.
41. See generally Law No. 20.744, tit. 12, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1198-
1201.
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the largest unions.42
These reforms will be of great interest to foreign investors, particu-
larly those who plan to engage in an enterprise that requires a large
Argentine labor force. Law No. 20.744 provides that the transferee of
title to any business entity becomes the successor to the obligations that
emerge under all the labor contracts existing at the time of transfer.43 If,
for any reason, an employee files a claim based on a labor contract
against his employer, both the transferee and the transferor may be sev-
erally liable.44 The employee may terminate the contract without liabil-
ity however, if the entity changes its purpose or operation; or, if as a
result of the transfer, the employee finds himself working in an entity
that has less responsibility than before the transfer.45
Due to the complexities of Argentine labor law, foreign investors
who merge with or acquire an Argentine business entity should inform
themselves of the obligations that may arise under Argentine labor law.
These obligations could lead to substantial liabilities for foreign inves-
tors, and should be considered when envisioning the future financial
statement of contemplated enterprises. In addition, the enhanced power
of the unions should be taken into account.
The following analysis will outline the traditional Argentine Labor
Contract Law and highlight the changes brought about by the Labor
Reform Law. Afterwards, this comment will consider the effects of
labor reform on foreign investment.
A. The Argentine Labor Contract Law and the Reform
1. LABOR CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
Law No. 20.744 outlines an elaborate scheme which governs all
labor contracts. A labor contract is required whenever "any person
accomplishes acts or loans services which benefit another person."46 It
is unlawful to perform work without a contract. Despite this prohibition,
an estimated four million Argentines are working without employment
contracts .
Courts will presume that a labor contract exists where acts or serv-
ices are provided.48 However, the presumption is rebuttable. For exam-
ple, in Martinez v. Radio Amirica, a journalist agreed to produce a
42. Law No. 25.013, ch. 3, at 3891.
43. Law No. 20.744, art. 225, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1197-98.
44. See Law No. 20.744, art. 228, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1198.
45. See id.
46. Law No. 20.744, art. 21, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1177.
47. See La reforma laboral debuta en un mercado en crisis [Labor Reform Debuts in a
Market in Crisis], CLARIN (Buenos Aires), September 4, 1998,<http://www.clarin.com.ar>.
48. See Law No. 20.744, art. 23, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, May 13, 1976,
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program for a radio station and to find his own advertisers for the pro-
gram.49 When the relationship between the two parties ceased, the jour-
nalist claimed that because he was an employee, he was entitled to an
indemnification from the radio station.5" The National Labor Court did
not agree. The court held that the facts of the case, such as the alleged
employee's agreement to find his own advertisers and thus his own
income, indicated that the journalist and the station had only a business
or contractual relationship, and not a labor relationship.51 This case
illustrates the court's establishment of an outer limit on the definition of
a labor contract, which is one barrier that the National Labor Courts
have established for plaintiffs seeking indemnification.
2. TYPES OF LABOR CONTRACTS
Most labor contracts, including those that are unwritten and/or pre-
sumed, are termed "Indeterminate Contracts. 52 Indeterminate Contracts
do not expire upon a particular date or event, but instead expire upon the
occurrence of an unscheduled event, such as retirement, death, dissolu-
tion of the business or renunciation of the contract by one of the par-
ties.53 A "Determinate Contract" terminates upon the occurrence of a
concrete event or date specifically written into the contract. 54
When possible, many businesses avoid entering into Indeterminate
Contracts since the termination of such contracts often results in large
indemnification awards. Employers instead prefer to utilize a contract
which expires upon a particular date or event, allowing the employer to
release the employee at the agreed upon time without having to pay any
indemnification. However, if an employer discharges an employee
without cause under a Determinate Contract prior to the expiration of the
contract, the employer is liable for the indemnification enumerated in
Article 250 for Indeterminate Contracts, and also for damages suffered
by the discharged employee that may be awarded by a civil court. 5
a. Trial Period
During the Trial Period, an employer may discharge an employee
[XXIV-D] A.D.L.A. 3225; "Banchero, Italo v. Embotelladora Noroeste S.A.," CTrab. Tucumdn
[Labor Court of Tucumdn Province] [1996-E] La Ley 455, 457.
49. "Martinez, Oviedo J. v. Radio America," CNTrab. [National Labor Court of Appeals]
[1994-El Derecho del Trabajo [Labor Law] 951, 952.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Law No. 20.744, art. 90, text ordered by executive decree 390/70, at 1182.
53. See id.
54. Law No. 20.744, art. 93-100, text ordered by executive decree 390/70, at 1182-83.
55. Law No. 20.744, art. 95, text ordered by executive decree 390/70, at 1183.
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without cause and not risk paying any indemnification. 6 Under the
original regime, the Trial Period for Indeterminate Contracts was the
first three months of the contract, although collective bargaining agree-
ments could extend this period up to six months.57 An employer can not
evade the intent of Labor Contract Law by contracting the same
employee for more than one Trial Period. 8
With the passage of the Labor Reform Act, the Trial Period for
Indeterminate Contracts was reduced to thirty days, but may still be
extended to six months by a collective bargaining agreement.59 The
shortening of this Trial Period is viewed as a loss for management. Pre-
viously, if a business owner saw an improvement in his business result-
ing in additional hiring needs, the owner might have hesitated to take on
additional employees due to concerns over the permanency of the
upswing. If it turned out that the improvement was only one part of a
short business cycle, the employer could discharge the employee for any
reason without indemnification. By shortening the Trial Period to thirty
days, an employer will be more likely to "wait and see" if the upturn in
business is permanent before hiring new workers.
b. Promotion Contracts
Prior to the passage of the Labor Reform Act, several types of
"Promotion Contracts" were created by the Employment Law of 1991.60
Promotion Contracts were specially designed to lower the potential costs
and liabilities of hiring persons in certain social groups. Specifically,
Promotion Contracts provided incentives to hire certain classes of work-
ers through total or partial reductions of payroll taxes, and through the
denial of indemnification claims for the discharge of such workers. 6'
The Argentine Congress had approved Promotion Contracts for women,
disabled persons and men over the age of forty-five. 62  The Labor
Reform Act eliminated those special contracts, retaining Promotion
Contracts for only internships and apprenticeships.63
An Apprenticeship Employment Contract may only be entered into
by employees between the ages of fifteen and twenty-eight. 64 An
56. See Law No. 25.013, art. 3, at 3888-90.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Law No. 24.013, at 3873.
61. See Trabajo en negro y evasidn fiscal [Black Market Labor and Fiscal Evasion], CLARN
(Buenos Aires), September 6, 1998, <http://www.clarin.com.ar>.
62. See Ojeda, supra note 9.
63. See id.
64. See Law No. 20.744, art. 189, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, At 1193. Law
No. 20.744 prohibits the employment of persons under the age of fifteen.
[Vol. 54:125
THE 1998 ARGENTINE LABOR REFORM ACT
employer may not enter into an Apprenticeship Contract with a person
who had previously worked for that specific employer.65 Additionally,
the number of Apprenticeship Contracts utilized by an employer may
not exceed ten percent of the total number of Indeterminate Contracts.66
The contract must be valid for at least three months, but no longer than
one year.6 7 An apprentice may not work more than forty hours per
week.68 The employer must give an apprentice thirty days notice before
discharging him, or pay an indemnity of one-half the apprentice's
monthly salary.69 If the proper notice is given, the employer is not
required to make an indemnification upon completion of the contract,
even if a full-time position is not offered.7° If the employer fails to
fulfill the statutory requirements for an Apprenticeship Contract, the
contract will be considered an Indeterminate Contract, which could lead
to full indemnification for a discharged apprentice.7'
The thirty day Trial Period for Indeterminate Contracts is actually
considered to be a type of Promotion Contract because it permits an
employer to take on an employee for thirty days without assuming the
same risks that accompany an Indeterminate Contract.72
Article 2 of the Labor Reform Act permits an Internship Employ-
ment Contract where the employee is a student, and the primary purpose
of employment is to train and complement the student's formal educa-
tion.73 The Act calls upon the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to
establish the regulations that will govern Internship Contracts. 4
c. The Effects of Labor Reform on Promotion Contracts
Many observers believed that the original employment contract
regime was too rigid and inflexible. In fact, many have termed the Labor
Reform Act the "Flexibility Reform. ' 75 However, the elimination of
Promotion Contracts for women, disabled persons and men over the age
of forty has caused great consternation among many.
Radil Lamacchia, a representative of a mercantile union, considers
65. See Law No. 25.013, art. 1, at 3888-89.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Ojeda, supra note 9.
73. See Law No. 25.013, art. 2, at 3889.
74. See id.
75. Mariano Hip6lito Grandoli, El nuevo rigimen laboral [The New Labor Regime], LA
NACION (Buenos Aires), October 10, 1998, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>.
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those eliminations to be negative aspects of the reform.7 6 Enrique Rod-
rfguez, a former Labor Minister, pointed out that there are currently 1.2
million workers with Promotion Contracts; only 200,000 of these are for
internships or apprenticeships, which will be unaffected by the reform.77
Although the one million remaining will not be immediately affected
since the Labor Reform Act is not retroactive, those workers will be
unable to renew their special contracts once they expire. 78 At the expira-
tion of their contracts, those workers will find themselves competing for
standard Indeterminate Contracts. Since employers will be without the
special incentives once provided by Promotion Contracts, those persons
will probably lose their positions to younger, able-bodied male employ-
ees that some employers may find more competitive. Given the current
high rate of unemployment, the competition will be keen for any new
job opening, and older men, women and disabled persons will be with-
out their customary advantage.
On the other hand, Mariano Hip6lito Grandoli, a former labor court
judge who is currently a professor at Austral University, claims that Pro-
motion Contracts, originally adopted in 1991 to decrease the unemploy-
ment rate for such persons, failed to achieve their goal.79 Professor
Grandoli believes that the protectionist policy of Promotion Contracts
increased the potential liability employers faced if they found it neces-
sary to discharge such employees in the future.8" He hypothesizes that
the potential indemnification award outweighed governmental incentives
to hire certain types of employees whom employers have traditionally
found undesirable. 8'
3. COMPENSATION FOR LABOR
Law 20.744 also sets forth the compensation an employer must pro-
vide an employee. Besides obeying the minimum wage law, the
employer must also provide all of the "Social Benefits" enumerated in
Article 103 (a) prior to the commencement of the labor relationship.
These Social Benefits include the following: access to the company din-
ing room, reimbursement for lunch on workdays, uniforms, child care
for the first six years of a child's life, and family medical expenses as
approved by the employer.8" If the compensation and reimbursements
are in dispute, courts may determine a just amount, considering the
76. See Disidencias entre de los empresarios, supra note 32.
77. See Ojeda, supra note 9.
78. See id.
79. See Grandoli, supra note 75.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Law No. 20.700, art. 1, September 25, 1996, [LVI-D] A.D.L.A. 4657, 4657-58.
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employee's efforts and results in the workplace.83
The Labor Contract Law also mandates the payment of an "Annual
Complementary Salary," also known as the "Thirteenth Salary."84 This
extra payment must be made to every employee and shall be the
equivalent of one month's salary.85 The Thirteenth Salary is paid in two
installments, half in June and half in December.86 If an employment
relationship terminates prior to the payment of the Thirteenth Salary, the
employer is obliged to pay the separating employee his pro rata share of
the Thirteenth Salary. 87 The Labor Reform Act did not alter the basic
compensation scheme.
4. FEMALE EMPLOYEES
The Argentine Labor Contract Law guarantees to women forty-five
days of maternity leave before and after giving birth, for a total of ninety
days.88 The mother may opt to take as little as thirty days prior to the
birth, and use the remainder after the child is born.89 The mother may
also elect to terminate the employment contract and receive twenty-five
percent of her annual salary as an indemnification.90 If an employer
discharges an expectant mother within six and one-half months prior to
or after childbirth, the court will presume that the mother was discharged
due to the pregnancy and order the employer to compensate the mother
with one year's salary.9 '
5. SUSPENSION OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
If an employee is the blameless victim of an unforeseen accident or
illness, Law 20.744 requires the employer continue to compensate the
employee for three or six months, depending on whether the employee
had completed more or less than five years of service.92 Although an
employer may hire a replacement during the interim, the employer must
maintain the position open for one year while awaiting the return of the
employee.93 If the employee does not return after one year, the
employer may discharge the employee without paying indemnifi-
83. See Law No. 20.744, art. 114, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1184-85.
84. Law No. 20.744, art. 121, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1185.
85. See id.
86. See Law No. 20.744, art. 122, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1185.
87. See Law No. 20.744, art. 123, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1185.
88. See Law No. 20.744, art. 177, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1192.
89. See id.
90. See Law No. 20.744, art. 183 (b), text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1192-93.
91. See Law No. 20.744, art. 178, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1192.
92. Law No. 20.744, art. 208, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1195-96.
93. See Law No. 20.744, art. 211, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1196.
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cation. 94
If after one year the accident or sickness continues to diminish the
employee's ability to perform the work assigned under the original con-
tract, the employer must assign the employee to duties that he or she is
able to complete, without any reduction in pay.95 If the employer is
unable to reassign the employee, the employer must indemnify the
employee for half of the amount calculated under the indemnification
plan to be described later.96 If the employer discharges the injured
employee, the employer will pay the indemnification and the outstand-
ing remuneration due to the employee for the remainder of the one year
period, tolling from the time the employee's service was interrupted. 97
Although collective bargaining agreements have tried to limit the appli-
cation of these articles, the National Labor Court of Appeals has
thwarted attempts to do so.98
Where an employer seeks to suspend a worker for just cause, the
employer may only do so a fixed period of time, and must be presented
in writing to the employee. 99 Reasons for just cause include: discipline,
force majeure and a reduction in business activity that is not attributable
to the employer.'00 Such suspensions shall not exceed thirty days,' 0 '
except in cases of force majeure, which shall not exceed seventy-five
days. 102 If any such suspension exceeds ninety days, the worker is con-
sidered to be discharged, granting him or her the right to appropriate
indemnification. 103
6. TRANSFER OF THE LABOR CONTRACT
If title to a business entity transfers as the result of a merger or
acquisition, the transferee must assume all of the labor obligations that
existed at the time of transfer. 0 4 If a business is leased, the lessees will
be liable for the obligations; however, both the transferor and the trans-
feree are severally liable for any obligations outstanding at the time of
94. See id.
95. See Law No. 20.744, art. 212, text ordered by executive decree 390/70, at 1196.
96. See id.
97. See Law No. 20.744, art. 213, text ordered by executive decree 390/70, at 1196.
98. See "Torres, Benjamina Amanda v. Instituto de Servicios Sociales para el Personal
Ferroviario," CNTrab. [National Labor Court of Appeals] [LI-B] Derecho del Trabajo [Labor
Law] 2224, 2225.
99. See Law No. 20.744, art. 218, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1197.
100. See Law No. 20.744, art. 219, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1197.
101. See Law No. 20.744, art. 220, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1197.
102. See Law No. 20.744, art. 221, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1197.
103. See Law No. 20.744, art. 222, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1197.
104. See Law No. 20.744, art. 225, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1197-98.
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transfer. °5 The National Labor Courts have liberally enforced these
provisions so as to grant indemnification to improperly discharged
employees.
For example, in Ldpez v. Des Nogueira, the defendant employers
acquired the enterprise after an employee had been discharged without
cause and without appropriate indemnification. 0 6 The court held that
even though the current owners were not responsible for the discharge
and lack of timely indemnification, the obligation transferred with the
business and thus became the obligation of the defendants.10 7
However, in Barbano v. Ferndndez, the court did limit the joinder
of defendants in a suit for unjust discharge without proper indemnifica-
tion. 10 8 In that case, the plaintiff wanted to join a person who took the
place of the owner as the on site supervisor of the business, without
assuming any type of ownership in the business. The National Labor
Court refused to join the supervisor and held that there must be some
type of transfer of property by means of negotiation between the trans-
feror and transferee before a labor obligation would be enforced against
the new owner."°9
These cases illustrate that where there is an arm's length negotia-
tion for ownership of business property; the National Labor Courts will
find that all labor obligations follow the business, regardless of the cul-
pability of the defendant-owner. The following section will highlight
the costs of assuming those obligations.
7. INDEMNIFICATION FOR THE TERMINATION OF A LABOR CONTRACT
a. Article 245 Indemnification (Discharge Without Cause)
Neither party to a labor contract shall terminate the contract without
warning.1 O Under the original regime, if the employee wanted to termi-
nate the employment relationship, he or she had to notify the employer
thirty days beforehand; if the employee did not, the employee had to
indemnify the employer one month's salary."' On the other hand, the
employer was required to give the employee one month's notice if the
employee had less than five years of service to the company, and two
105. See Law No. 20.744, art. 226, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1198.
106. "Lopez, Pldcido R.V. Des Noreguira, Adolfo," CNTrab. [National Labor Court of
Appeals][1994-A] Derecho del Trabajo [Labor Law] 518, 519-20.
107. See id.
108. See "Barbano, Carlos A. v. Fernndez, Jos6 L. et al.," CNTrab. [National Labor Court of
Appeals] [1994-B] Derecho del Trabajo [Labor Law] 1744, 1745.
109. See id.
110. See Law No. 20.744, art. 231, text ordered by executive decree 390/70, at 1198.
111. See id.
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months for more than five years of service. 12 If either the employer or
the employee terminated the employment relationship with less than the
required notice, the terminating party had to compensate the other the
amount of wages that would have been paid during the remainder of the
notification period." 3 If the parties "unequivocally and conclusively
agree," they may terminate the relationship at any time by mutual
consent. 4
These time periods have been revised by the Labor Reform Act.
An employee now only needs to give fifteen days notice to his or her" 15
employer. Also, the employer only needs to forewarn an employee with
fifteen days notice if the employee has between thirty days and three
months of service." 16 For an employee with less than five years but
more than three months of service, the notice continues to be one month;
for an employee with more than five years of service, the required notice
is still two months.' '
7
In either case, indemnification for lack of proper notice does not
relieve the employer of any other indemnification that may be due to the
employee for an unjust discharge." 8 In addition, the employer must
grant the worker two hours of leave per day to seek other
employment." 9
All discharges are considered to be either for just cause or without
just cause. If one party terminates the employment relationship, the
court will determine whether there was just cause.' 20 If the court deter-
mines that the discharge was without just cause, then Article 245 indem-
nification will apply, whether or not proper notification was given to the
employee.' 2 ' If an employee resigns, and the court determines that there
was just cause for the resignation, it will be considered an "indirect dis-
charge," which entitles the employee to indemnification. 2
2
The indemnification under Article 245 can be hefty. The payment
will be one month's salary for each year of service or for a three month
fraction thereof, using the highest monthly salary earned during the last
112. See id.
113. See Law No. 20.744, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1198.
114. Law No. 20.744, art. 241, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1199; see also "Di
Salvo, Edo H. v. Somisa," CNTrab. [National Labor Court of Appeals] [1994-B] Derecho del
Trabajo [Labor Law] 1984, 1985.
115. See Law No. 25.013, art. 6, at 3890.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See Law No. 20.744, art. 236, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1199.
119. See Law No. 20.744, art. 237, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1199.
120. See Law No. 20.744, art. 242, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1199.
121. See Law No. 24.013, art. 153, at 3903.
122. Law No. 20.744, art. 246, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1200.
[Vol. 54:1!25
THE 1998 ARGENTINE LABOR REFORM ACT
year of employment as the basis for calculation.' 23 For example, if an
employee has ten years of service and earned one thousand dollars per
month during the last year of service, the proper indemnification would
be ten thousand dollars. Even if the parties contract for a different
indemnification amount, the minimum indemnification for discharge
without just cause is two month's salary.' 24
The Labor Reform Act retained the formula for Article 245 indem-
nification, but added a ceiling for the base salary used to calculate the
indemnification. The indemnification is now one-twelfth of the base
monthly salary for each year of service. 125 In the example above, the
indemnification would still be ten thousand dollars. However, there is
now a cap on the indemnification. Under any contract, the base salary
for indemnification can not exceed three month's salary of the salary
contemplated in the appropriate collective bargaining agreement, regard-
less of the time of service. Therefore, the indemnification of a dis-
charged employee's base salary is affected only if the employee's
monthly salary is greater than three times the salary stipulated in a col-
lective bargaining agreement for his particular occupation.
In addition, the Labor Reform Act provides a cause of action for a
claim where there is a discharge motivated by discrimination on the
basis of race, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, religion, or political
or unionist ideology or opinion.' 26 For such discriminatory discharges,
the modified Article 245 indemnification will be increased by thirty
percent. 27
1. Legislative Indemnification Limits
The legislature has had the most obvious and significant impact on
the indemnification amount. The legislature prescribed the basic rule
that an employee discharged without just cause will receive one month's
salary for each year of seniority, and that the base used for the calcula-
tion shall be the highest monthly salary received during the last year of
service. On its face, the rule seems to dictate the precise amount that
an employee would receive. However, labor and management are still
free to contract their own indemnification provisions. Therefore, Article
245 also states that a collective bargaining agreement cannot stipulate a
base salary used for the indemnification calculation that is more than
three times the average of the monthly salaries of the employees whose
123. See Law No. 24.013, art. 153, at 3903.
124. See id.
125. See Law No. 25.013, art. 7, at 3890.
126. Law No. 25.013, art. 1I, at 3891.
127. See id.
128. See id.
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contracts are covered by the agreement. 129 The Labor and Social Secur-
ity Ministry of the executive branch is responsible for determining the
average monthly salary. 3 ' As for the lower limit, Article 245 states that
in no case shall the total indemnification be less than two month's
salary. 131
Therefore, the National Congress has determined that every unjust
discharge shall net at least two months' salary for the discharged
employee. The Congress also set a ceiling for the base salary that can be
used to calculate an indemnification award. However, these legislative
limits only begin to narrow the range of indemnification that may be
available to a discharged employee. The judiciary has also placed con-
siderable limits on the size of an indemnification.
2. Judicial Indemnification Limits
The judicial branch has placed limits on indemnification in two dif-
ferent ways: by limiting what compensation can be included in the base
salary, and by setting a floor on the indemnification amount that an
employer can include in a labor contract.
First, the courts have had an impact on the indemnification amount
by delineating what can and cannot be included in the monthly base
salary used to calculate the indemnification. The courts have held that
the following will not be included in the monthly base salary for the
purpose of computing an indemnification: meals that are provided by
the employer and are consumed outside of the workplace, the "thir-
teenth" monthly salary, any annual or quarterly bonuses, and any addi-
tional pay for temporary extra duties.'32
Many discharged employees who have received an indemnification
have brought suit against their employers claiming that the employer did
not include certain bonuses in the base monthly figure used to calculate
the indemnification. A common allegation is that the employer
attempted to reduce his liability by dispersing a significant portion of the
employee's salary throughout the year in order to lessen the monthly
base amount. Given the long list of bonuses that are not included in the
base salary, it appears that this tactic has worked well for
management. 133
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See "Hern6ndez, Ester v. Sace," CNTrab. [National Labor Court of Appeals] [1994-B]
Derecho del Trabajo [Labor Law] 1185, 1186; see also "Sosa, Antonio et al. v. Frigorifico
Minguill6n S.A.," CNTrab. [National Labor Court of Appeals] [1994-B] Derecho del Trabajo
[Labor Law] 1196, 1197.
133. See generally "DeMarchi, Emilio 0. v. Bank of America S.A.," CNTrab. [National Labor
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In fact, the National Labor Courts strongly favor management on
this point. In Herndndez v. Sace, the plaintiff wanted to include his meal
reimbursements and annual bonus in the monthly base salary used to
calculate indemnification. 34 The court not only declined to do so, but
also stated that the constitutional concept of "equal pay for equal
work" 135 is not relevant to the valuation of the base salary. 136 This
opened the door for employers to disperse an employee's true monthly
salary into bonuses and other "perks," in order to lessen possible indem-
nification costs. 137
As for the second limitation, labor has had success in creating a
floor that a contract can set for the base salary used to calculate the
indemnification. Plaintiff attorneys have established this floor by chal-
lenging the constitutionality of labor contracts that set a low base salary,
such as the government prescribed minimum wage for that occupation,
for the computation of an indemnification when the actual monthly sal-
ary may be much higher.
For example, in Marianetti v. Bodegas and Vitiedos L6pez S.A., the
plaintiff was a lawyer who had served for thirty-two years as a general
administrator for farming businesses. 138 His employer terminated the
labor contract and, in accordance with the contract, the employer used
the federal monthly minimum wage, 1700 pesos, as the base salary to
compute the employee's indemnification. 39 The contract stated that
three times the minimum wage, the statutory maximum, would be paid
for each year of service 4 ° . Under this calculation, the employer paid
163,200 pesos. However, the monthly salary of the lawyer was actually
18,000 pesos. Using the Article 245 formula, the plaintiff could have
received 576,000 pesos."'
In his effort to increase his indemnification despite the terms of the
contract, Marianetti claimed that the establishment of a low base salary,
as compared to his actual monthly salary, was unconstitutional because
it deprived him of his right to be protected from arbitrary discharge. 4 2
Court of Appeals] [1994-A] Derecho del Trabajo [Labor Law] 955, 956, for the complete list of
what may or may not be included in the base salary for the computation of an indemnification.
134. "Hernandez v. Sace" at 1185.
135. CONST. ARG., art 14 bis.
136. See "Hernndez v. Sace" at 1186.
137. See generally "Hernndez v. Sace."
138. "Marianetti, Luis P. v. Bodegas and Vifiedos L6pez S.A.," SC Mendoza [Supreme Court
of Mendoza Province] [1996-E] La Ley 498, 500; see also "DeMarchi v. Bank of America S.A."
at 956.
139. See "Marianetti v. Bodegas and Vifiedos L6pez S.A." at 500.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 501. At that time, the value of one Argentine Peso had already been set at one
U.S. dollar.
142. See id. at 500.
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Article 14 of the Argentine Constitution states that all persons shall be
protected from arbitrary discharge. 143 Marianetti argued that the low
base salary in his contract did not adequately protect him from arbitrary
discharge since the resulting indemnification would be relatively low in
relation to his true salary.144 If Marianetti were to receive the federal
statutory indemnification, his employer would have been more reluctant
to fire him without cause.
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but in a limited fashion.
The court found that the Article 245 ceiling was constitutional in princi-
ple, and that the separation of powers principle precluded the judiciary
from reviewing the average salary determined by the Labor Ministry. 145
The court stated that the figure was a "complex political and economic
[question], reserved for the discretion of the Executive Power." 1 46 How-
ever, the court then limited its ruling by holding that if the average sal-
ary was "absurd or arbitrary," or had not been reasonably adjusted for
inflation or the consumer price index, then the court could review and
adjust the figure. 147
Employing the doctrine provided by Antonio Vazquez Vialard, 148
the court held that where the base salary set by the government was
unreasonable, the court would determine a more reasonable figure,
rather than finding the government process or figure unconstitutional. In
this case, the court did adjust the figure and awarded the plaintiff 38,400
pesos, in addition to the 163,200 pesos that he had already received. 149
Although the court did increase the size of the plaintiff's award, the
result was a far cry from the 576,000 pesos that could have been
awarded under a literal interpretation of Article 245.
The dicta in the opinion contained more bad news for labor. The
court insinuated that in future determinations on the constitutionality of
the base salary in a labor contract, the court would not consider the true
salary of the employee, the number of months the employee was short of
retirement, nor the number of years the employee had worked in the
business.' 5 ° Instead the court would only consider whether the base sal-
ary determined by the government met the requirements of Article 116
143. Constit. Arg., art. 14 bis.
144. See "Marianetti v. Bodegas and Vifiedos L6pez S.A." at 500.
145. See id. at 508.
146. Id. at 507.
147. Id.
148. Antonio Vazquez Vialard, Razonabilidad de los topes fijados a los fines de determinar el
monto de las indemnizaciones que prescribe el Derecho del Trabajo [The Rationality of Fixed
Limits for the Determination of the Amount of Indemnification Prescribed by the Labor Law],
[1996-E] La Ley 498.
149. See "Marianetti v. Bodegas and Vifiedos L6pez S.A." at 509.
150. See id.
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of the labor law: the salary must assure "proper subsistence, dignified
living, education, clothing, humanitarian assistance ...,"I This dicta
seems to imply that an amount close to the regulatory minimum wage
will be supplanted for a contract's stipulated base salary if the stipulated
base salary is less than the minimum wage.
This case illustrates the power of unionization: a strong union can
contract for a base salary three times the actual monthly salary of an
employee, and since that is the legislatively prescribed upper limit, such
a contract term would likely survive judicial scrutiny. However, a non-
union employee, who is likely to have less bargaining power than his
employer, may settle for a low base salary in his contract. As Marianetti
indicates, a National Labor Court will not find the low base salary
unconstitutional, and will likely adjust the amount only slightly above
the minimum wage.
b. Article 247 Indemnification (Discharge Due to Loss of Business)
Article 247 of the original labor law provides a second type of
indemnification: one-half the amount calculated under Article 245.152
Article 247 applies where the employer or employee dies; however,
indemnification upon the death of the employee does not extinguish any
claim that the heirs may have under workers compensation, collective
bargaining agreements, insurance or other contractual provisions. 153
Remarkably, an Article 247 indemnification is also due upon the
natural expiration of a labor contract with a fixed expiration date. 154
This is true even if the indemnification is not provided for in the con-
tract. Prior to entering into such a contract, management must consider
this cost as part of the total labor costs for the enterprise.
In the case of bankruptcy, the employer must pay an Article 247
indemnification if fault for the bankruptcy is not imputable to the
employer. 55 If fault for the bankruptcy is imputed to the employer, the
larger Article 245 indemnification is due. 156 The determination of
imputability will be made by the court during bankruptcy
proceedings. 157
Under the Labor Reform Act, any failure to pay the indemnification
151. Id. at 507.
152. Law No. 20.744, art. 247, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1200.
153. Law No. 20.744, art. 248, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1200.
154. Law No. 20.744, art. 250, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1200.
155. See Law No. 24.522, art. 294, July 20, 1995, [LV-D] A.D.L.A. 4381, 4423. Law No.
24.522 is a bankruptcy law that modifies the labor law of 20.744.
156. See id.
157. See id.
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will create the presumption of malice or recklessness. 158 The presump-
tion automatically leads to the imposition of interest at two and a half
times the official rate that will be levied upon the indemnification
amount. 159
The part of Article 247 that has spawned much litigation is the
provision for special indemnification where there is a reduction in the
demand for labor that is not attributable to the employer. Here, the
temptation for the employer is to masquerade an unjust discharge as one
driven by changes in the market economy. In addition, an employer
may cite force majeure in order to obtain the reduced indemnification;
however, the employer must observe a seventy-five day waiting period
after the force majeure event before discharging an employee. 60
For example, in Sosa, et al. v. Frigorifico Minguillrn S.A., a com-
pany discharged several employees and paid only Article 245 indemnifi-
cation, claiming that an energy crisis caused a downturn in the firm's
business."'6 The employer prevailed at trial, and on appeal the plaintiffs
argued that their employer did not offer any proof in the trial court that
there was a genuine energy crisis, or if there was, that it had affected the
company. 6 2 The National Labor Court agreed and held that it is not
sufficient to allege that the existence of a general crisis in the economy
precipitated the lack of work; rather, the defendant employer must show
that the enterprise was in a "critical state" that was not caused by its own
conduct and that the employer had taken measures to mitigate the dam-
age to the business.' 63
Carlos Pose, an author of labor law doctrine, has outlined the
events that enable an employer to make an Article 247 dismissal for
force majeure.164 For example, Pose believes that the destruction of the
real property of an enterprise by fire can be grounds for a force majeure
dismissal in certain situations. 165 He argues that an employer could only
discharge employees after a fire if the destruction made it impossible to
carry on the business, and even then, the employer could only discharge
the employees whose positions of employment were eliminated by the
158. See Law No. 25.013, art. 9, at 3291.
159. See Law No. 20.744, art. 275, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1203.
160. See Law No. 20.744, art. 221, text ordered by executive decree 390/76, at 1197.
161. "Sosa, Antonio, et al. v. Frigorifico Minguill6n S.A." at 1197.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Carlos Pose, El incendio del establecimiento fabril como factor legitimante de la
aplicacion de las previsiones del art culo 247 de la ley de contrato de trabajo [Destruction by
Fire of the Factory Plant as a Legitimate Reason for the Application of article 247 of the
Employment Contract Law] [1994-B] Derecho del Trabajo [Labor Law] 2319, 2320.
165. See id.
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fire.166 Pose would not permit an employer to take advantage of a rela-
tively small amount of destruction by making a wholesale discharge of
most or all of his employees in order to take advantage of the fifty per-
cent indemnification.1
67
In the case of Grmez et al. v. Hisisa Argentina S.A., the court fol-
lowed Pose's interpretation of the force majeure doctrine and deter-
mined that the enterprise had been totally destroyed, and that the
employer could use the Article 247 indemnification.168 However, the
opinion did warn that it would not permit employers to abuse force
majeure when the destruction was not total.1 69
Thus, the National Labor Courts have been careful not to allow
businesses to abuse the Article 245 indemnification. According to the
case law and doctrine, a business owner will only be able to use the
lessened indemnification where the force majeure event is truly cata-
strophic or where the downturn in the economy that is cited by the
defense as the reason for the discharge is truly the reason for the dis-
charge. While a strict interpretation of force majeure and a requirement
that a decrease in business activity is unattributable to the employer may
appear to be fairer to a discharged employee, these interpretations are
precisely what cause Argentine and foreign investors to hesitate before
acquiring or increasing the size of their labor force. This hesitancy
adversely affects unemployment.
c. Reactions to Changes in the Indemnification Scheme
Lowering the indemnification, either by judicial or legislative
means, is the focus of the debate over labor reform. Many believe that
the Labor Reform Act did not go far enough to alleviate the disastrous
rate of unemployment. Silvio Macchiavello, the first vice-president of
the Argentine Chamber of Commerce, stated that "this law will not con-
tribute to a decrease in the unemployment rate and will increase labor
costs if it is not accompanied by tax reform."1 7 ° Many economists have
agreed that such measures will retard job growth and will foster a greater
turnover rate of workers.' 7 ' Additionally, Fernando de la Rda, the
newly elected President of Argentina, agrees stating "it is a fiction to say
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. "G6mez, Juan C. et al. v. Hisisa Argentina S.A.," CNTrab. [National Labor Court of
Appeals] [1994-B] Derecho del Trabajo [Labor Law] 2319, 2321.
169. See id.
170. Disidencias entre los empresarios, supra note 32.
171. See Ojeda, supra note 9.
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that this law will resolve the unemployment problem."'' 12 Even the Min-
ister of Labor, Antonio Erman Gonzalez, admitted that "one cannot gen-
erate employment by law."'' 73
Mariano Grondona, columnist for La Naci6n, concurs. He points
out that while the Argentine economy has grown at a fantastic rate - six
percent annually from 1991 to 1998, the largest increase since the
1920's - unemployment remained between eighteen and thirteen percent,
the highest in Argentine history. In Grondona's words, "the economy
grew .. .[but] the employers did not employ."' 174
In Grondona's opinion, the Argentine economy has inevitably
become more capitalistic, yet has retained a European-style socialistic
labor regime.' He believes that this is an "incoherent" state of exist-
ence that must be reconciled. 176 Noberto Sosa, a leader of the Argentine
business Proeco, agrees stating that "a capitalist market and an inflexible
[labor] regime produce high rates of unemployment, a high percentage
of black market employment and a poor use of resources."' 77
On the other hand, Antonio Erman Gonzales, Minister of Labor,
praised the reform precisely because he believes it will open the labor
market to the nation's youth through apprenticeship and internship
contracts. 178
To make matters more complicated, some believe that other market
forces are the primary causes for high unemployment. In 1991, Argen-
tina enacted the so-called "Convertibility Law," which fixes the value of
one peso to one dollar. 179 Eduardo Conesa, an economist, believes that
this artificial increase in the value of the peso caused a corresponding
artificial increase in the value of Argentine labor.' 8 ° For example, if an
Argentine laborer earned three hundred and fifty pesos per month prior
to convertibility, that worker suddenly earned more than seven hundred
pesos after the passage of the plan.' 8' Conesa hypothesizes that the
growth of labor costs in dollars caused Argentine businesses to reduce
172. El coro de la oposici6n [The Chorus of Opposition], CLARIN (Buenos Aires), September
4, 1998, <http://www.clarin.com.ar>.
173. Menem estd feliz por la reforma, supra note 38.
174. Grondona, supra note 19.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Gustavo Sencio, Y el l a 1 Fue un Triunfo [And the 1 to / Was a Triumph], NEGOCIOS
(Buenos Aires), June 1998, <http://www.atiandia.com.ar>.
178. See Ojeda, supra note 9.
179. See Ocampo, supra note 24.
180. See Eduardo Conesa, La principal causa de desempleo en nuestro pa(s radica en el tipo
de cambio atrasado [The Principle Cause of Unemployment in Our Country Is Rooted in the
Slowed Exchange Rate], EL CRONISTA (Buenos Aires), September 7, 1998, <http://
www.cronista.com.ar>.
181. See id.
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costs by lowering salaries and hiring fewer people.' 82 It is his proposi-
tion that "if the cause is maintained, that is the convertibility, then the
effect will be maintained, which is unemployment."' 83
The leader of one of the largest labor unions opposes the measures
to cut the indemnification. Silvio Macchiavello, of the Argentine Com-
merce Union ("CAC"), believes that such reforms should not be made
unless accompanied by tax reform.' 84 Although he did not elaborate, the
probable reason for his union's opposition is that any stagnation in job
growth would also impede the growth of Argentina's unions, thereby
affecting their negotiating power.
A recently proposed revision to the Labor Reform Act would create
a fund for indemnification. Businesses would pay a tax of 2.5 percent of
their monthly payroll; the revenues from this tax would be deposited
into a national fund providing indemnification to discharged employees
when appropriate. 85 One critic of this new form of risk-spreading, Pro-
fessor Grandoli, a former National Labor Court judge, has argued that:
(1) The fund unjustly requires all employers to contribute to indemnifi-
cation when it is only a few who have discharged employees without
just cause; (2) The availability of such funds to satisfy the liabilities of
employers will not provide an incentive for employers to refrain from
discharging without cause; and (3), The fund may be unconstitutional. ' 86
Professor Grandoli believes the fund may be unconstitutional because a
contribution of 2.5 percent will not provide a sufficient disincentive for
employers to refrain from discharging employees without just cause,
and the workers' constitutional right to work will suffer.'87 The facts of
Marianetti do not indicate whether a court would agree with Professor
Grandoli.
One point that Professor Grandoli may have overlooked is that the
fund will provide indemnification not only for employees who are dis-
charged without just cause, but also for those who are discharged due to
force majeure or reduced business through no fault of the employer.
Some may consider the fund to be an appropriate way of spreading the
risk of fluctuations in the economy to all businesses. Perhaps the fund
should only be used for an Article 247 indemnification, leaving the lia-
bility for unjust cause indemnification to the culpable employer.
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. See Disidencias entre de los empresarios, supra note 32.
185. See Grandoli, supra note 75.
186. See id.
187. See id.
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B. The Empowerment of Large Labor Unions Under the
Labor Reform Act
One of the most contentious aspects of the Labor Reform Act is
that it greatly aggrandized the power of organized labor in Argentina.
Article 14 (a) of the Argentine Constitution guarantees that labor unions
shall have the following rights: to execute collective bargaining agree-
ments, to resort to conciliation and arbitration, and to strike.' 88 In addi-
tion, union representatives enjoy the guarantees necessary for the
accomplishment of negotiations and stabilization of employment.189
The Labor Reform Act gave teeth to these organized labor rights.
First, the Act provides for the creation of a Mediation and Arbitra-
tion Service, to be administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social
Security. 190 The law requires that the Ministry consult the largest
worker unions, specifically requiring consultation with the CGT,' 9 1 the
General Workers Confederation, which is the largest union in the coun-
try. Either party in a labor dispute may request the assistance of the
Mediation and Arbitration Service.
Article 14 of the Act empowers the appropriate union with the larg-
est membership to represent the workers in collective bargaining negoti-
ations. 92 For example, if there is a strike by truck drivers, the largest
truck driver's union will represent the strikers. Any union that has more
than five hundred members engaged in similar occupations must include
in its delegation a member nominated by the union and elected by its
members. 193
The reform specifically empowers the larger unions to negotiate the
length of workdays, work weeks and vacations. 94 The Act also pro-
vides a hierarchy for multiple agreements over the same issue. If an
agreement that is small in scope is followed by an agreement that is
larger in scope and covers the same issue, then the former will prevail,
so long as the same parties are involved.' 95 After the first agreement
expires, it will remain in force for one year unless the parties reach an
understanding to have the agreement with the larger scope take effect. 19 6
The Labor Reform Act also created the Commission for the Contin-
uation of the Employment Contract Regime, which is charged with the
188. CONST. ARG., art. 14 bis.
189. See id.
190. See Law No. 25.013, art. 13, at 3892.
191. See id.
192. Law No. 25.013, art. 14, at 3892.
193. See id.
194. See Law No. 25.013, art. 15, at 3892.
195. See id.
196. See id.
[Vol. 54:125
THE 1998 ARGENTINE LABOR REFORM ACT
evaluation of collective bargaining agreements and with proposing mod-
ifications to such agreements in order to promote new job growth.' 97
The Commission is comprised of six members: two representatives
from government, two representatives from the CGT, and two represent-
atives from the largest unions other than the CGT. 98
Some Argentine business leaders see this empowerment of labor
unions as a positive development. Francisco Macri, a leading Buenos
Aires businessman, told La Naci6n that the reinforcement of the unions'
bargaining rights will "promote the dialogue between business leaders
and unions."1 99 In his experience, this would be considered a positive
development by foreign investors.2 °°
Others, such as Mariano Grondona, have taken a more skeptical
view. Grondona believes that there are two types of workers in Argen-
tina: those who are protected by the CGT, and those who are not.
20
'
Grondona hints that those who are covered by the umbrella of the CGT
will disproportionately benefit from the increased union power under the
Labor Reform Act.20 2 He asserts that the combined effect of increasing
the power of certain unions and the annulment of Promotion Contracts
will force workers back "into the streets. 20 3
Perhaps the comments of Daniel Funes de Rioja, the legal advisor
to the Argentine Industrial Union, best explain the unions' contradictory
opinions on the Labor Reform Act. Funes believes that the limitation of
Promotion Contracts to internships and apprenticeships will impede the
access of women, the handicapped and older men to the labor market.204
However, he does not doubt that the reform will increase the power of
the unions and will preserve many of jobs and rights that union workers
now have.20 5
In short, different unions fare differently under the Labor Reform
Act. Clearly, the CGT walks away from the reform with more solidified
bargaining power than it had in the past. This means that CGT workers
will be able to bargain for more favorable contract terms, such as a
higher base salary for the indemnification computation. As noted by the
business persons who spoke with La Naci6n, some business leaders see
the enhanced regulation of union power as a positive development
197. Law No. 25.013, art. 18, at 3892.
198. See id.
199. Disidencias entre de los empresarios, supra note 32.
200. See id.
201. See Grondona, supra note 19.
202. See id.
203. Id.
204. See Ojeda, supra note 9.
205. See id.
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because it will reduce the number of unions with which management
must negotiate and it will provide a framework for those negotiations.
However, none of these developments provide any assistance for
non-union workers or workers belonging to smaller unions. In fact, the
enhanced power of the CGT and other large unions may be viewed as a
serious setback for such workers. With its powerful bargaining position,
the CGT could easily secure most of an enterprise's budget designated
for worker compensation for its own workers, and leave little for non-
union workers. Even worse for the non-unionist, the CGT could insist
that an enterprise completely refrain from hiring non-union workers. The
enhanced power of only the largest unions will make it more difficult for
a non-unionist to obtain and secure employment. In addition, with the
elimination of most Promotion Contracts, the only hope for certain
classes of workers, such as women, older men and disabled persons, is
that they become members of one of the large unions.
III. THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF LABOR REFORM ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The Labor Reform Act affects not only the internal economic bal-
ance of power in Argentina, but it also has repercussions on how foreign
investors view business opportunities in Argentina. From 1980 to 1992,
net foreign investment in Argentina grew from 739 million dollars per
year to 2.4 billion dollars per year. 0 6 Much of that increase is attributa-
ble to the State Reform Law, which encouraged the privatization of state
enterprises with foreign capital, and the Economic Emergency Law,
which mandated equal treatment for domestic and foreign capital
expenditures.20 7 Many observers have asked how this growth in direct
foreign investment will be affected by the Labor Reform Act. Of
course, even the most adventurous economist would hesitate to make a
specific estimate, but there are many organizations and persons who
have been predicting trends that may soon develop.
By passing the Labor Reform Act, Argentina has only fulfilled one
of its promises to the International Monetary Fund ("IMF").2 °8 The
IMF's objectives in Argentina are to encourage the restoration of a
sound balance of payments, as well as creating price stability and
increasing economic growth.20 9 Specifically, the IMF requested that
206. See FOREIGN CAPITAL IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 24, at 10.
207. See id. at 9.
208. See Andrea Centeno, El gobierno festeja con euforia la flexibilizacidn [The Government
Euphorically Celebrates Flexibilization], LA NACI6N (Buenos Aires), September 4, 1998, <http://
www.lanacion.com.ar>.
209. See Luis MANZETTI, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION - THE ARGENTINE CASE, 17 (1991).
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Argentina increase the length of the Trial Period and extend the terms of
existing collective bargaining agreements where the parties are unable to
renew the agreements.2 ' The IMF indicated that it would approve the
transfer of funds for the upcoming fiscal quarter since the most impor-
tant macroeconomic objectives had been met.2 ' Teresa Ter Minassian
of the IMF warned, however, that the Labor Reform Act was not as
extensive as the IMF had hoped, and added that the organization would
be watching closely how the reform affects, or fails to affect, the labor
market in Argentina.2"2 Considering the recent difficulties faced by
nearly all of Latin America's economies, it may be difficult to asses the
merits of labor reform since it will make its "debut in a market in
crisis." '213
It is important to note that the debut of labor reform will not occur
in a vacuum. The Argentine Investment Foundation points out that any
labor reform in Argentina will also debut in a market undergoing region-
alization.2"4 Mercosur is a South American free trade organization made
up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Since Argentine labor
costs are considered to be about thirty percent greater than those of Bra-
zil, the free trade market initiated by Mercosur may severely limit any
possible decreases in unemployment that might have been delivered by
the Labor Reform Act.215
On the other hand, Mercosur may provide a unique comparative
advantage for some Argentine laborers. Since Argentina has a reputa-
tion for having some of the most highly educated and skilled workers in
Latin America, more South and North American businesses may locate
in Argentina if their businesses require more highly skilled labor.216
In an interview with Negocios, an Argentine business periodical,
Manuel Sacerdote, the Argentine president of BankBoston, revealed his
displeasure with the labor reform. He termed the reform a "retrogres-
sion" since he believes that the reform is neither beneficial for those who
are currently working nor for those who are presently unemployed.217 In
210. See La reforma laboral debuta en un mercado en crisis, supra note 47.
211. See Jorge Rosales, El FMI aprobard las metas que el Gobierno planted para el semestre
[The IMF Will Approve the Goals Set by the Government for the Semester], LA NAC1ON (Buenos
Aires), September 5, 1998, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>.
212. See id.
213. La reforma laboral debuta en un mercado en crisis, supra note 47.
214. See FUNDACION INVERTIR ARGENTINA [ARGENTINE INVESTMENT FOUNDATION], The Labor
Economy (visited Aug. 20, 1999) <http://www.invertir.com>. The Argentine Investment
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particular, Sacerdote believes that the elimination of the majority of Pro-
motion Contracts will take away many of the advantages that the previ-
ous labor regime offered to businesses.21 8 In his opinion, elimination of
those contracts means that employers will decline to employ a substan-
tial number of previously employable persons, which will in turn raise
the cost of doing business in Argentina.2 9 The loss of Promotion Con-
tracts means that the rules that apply for young male workers will also
apply for female, older male and disabled employees. This will
undoubtedly raise the estimated labor cost for any business venture, thus
discouraging foreign investment.
Privatization is another curious aspect of the foreign investment
and labor problem. With the liberalization of the economy, many priva-
tizations have occurred in Argentina in recent years, and many of the
buyers have been foreign investors. In 1997 alone, 752 million dollars
of the direct foreign investment in Argentina entered the country through
the purchase of state-owned companies. 220 There will be many more
privatizations in the future, including Banco de la Naci6n, the largest
bank in Argentina.221 Massive layoffs have followed many of these
privatizations since many state-owned entities had far more personnel
than necessary. For example, the privatization of a state railroad system
resulted in a reduction of the workforce from 130,000 to 20,000.222
A bloated bureaucracy was probably not the only reason for the
layoffs that followed privatizations; undoubtedly, the future liability of
having so many employees that could potentially recoup indemnification
caused the purchasers of the privatized entities to lay off more personnel
earlier, rather than later. When these privatizations took place, the labor
contracts which the purchasers inherited were governed by the original
employment contract regime. Under that regime, each employee could
be awarded an indemnity of one month salary for each year of service.
Therefore, the purchasers had an incentive to lay off as many of the
newly acquired employees as they possibly could, and to do so as soon
as possible after the transfer of title. If there was a shortfall in the left
over labor, the investor could simply require his retained employees to
work overtime. This may be preferable to an investor since the hiring of
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See MINISTRY OF THE ECONOMY, WORKS AND PUBLIC SERVICES, El Fondo Monetaria
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each new employee will carry with it the potential for indemnification
later.
As stated earlier, it will be difficult to assess the effectiveness of the
Labor Reform Act since it will not debut in a vacuum. Instead, observ-
ers will have to carve out other economic effects, most notably the
recent drop in the stock markets of nearly every Latin American country,
in order to fairly assess the merits of the reform. However, it is probably
safe to assume the flexibilization of the labor market will make Argen-
tine privatizations more attractive to foreign investors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Labor Reform Act of 1998 has made a variety of changes to
the Labor Contract Law. Although the Trial Period was shortened to
thirty days, a collective bargaining agreement may still permit up to six
months. The shortened standard period favors workers and is
unwelcomed by management. Of course, the ability to lengthen the
Taril Period is still a useful tool that the larger unions may use at the
bargaining table. In addition, the large unions will also have the ability
to negotiate for an enlargement of the indemnification base salary to
three month's salary. As seen in Marianetti, however, a non-union
worker will probably be unable to get anything more than minimum
wage for his base salary. The elimination of Promotion Contracts for
women, older men and disabled persons puts those workers at a great
disadvantage if they are not members of a large union.
For many, the status of Argentine labor law is "incoherent" because
it is in the middle stages of an evolution from a European-socialist
model to an American-free market model. The latest development in
this "incoherent" state has produced clear winners and clear losers. The
winners are the CGT and other large unions, and the losers are the non-
union workers, particularly women, older men and disabled persons.
The predicament of Argentine business owners and foreign investors is
not so clear. While their causes may have been forwarded somewhat,
their dreams of an unrestrained labor market remain unfulfilled.
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